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n the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution 
procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. Prepared for discussion at the 
2nd CEPS Ideas Lab, this Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. 
The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US 
regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and 
resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to 
preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting 
moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not 
allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does. 
Introduction 
Following the generous government support to banks in the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic have adopted 
legislation that strengthens market discipline and facilitates orderly resolution of complex 
banks. A principal goal of these reforms has been to limit, if not prohibit, the possibility of 
government bail-outs for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This 
commentary discusses the main differences between the two schemes. 
In the US, resolution of deposit-taking institutions is subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act (FDIA). Included within the many issues addressed by the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) is a 
new resolution framework for SIFIs called the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). OLA is 
designed exclusively to address the failure of SIFIs when resolution under the normal 
insolvency statutes would potentially impair financial stability. In Europe, there are two 
systems based on geographical coverage. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD), which applies to all member states in the EU, and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) Regulation (collectively the EU Framework), which applies only to the euro-area 
countries, are limited to credit institutions, financial (and mixed financial) holdings and 
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investment firms. For the euro-area countries a Single Resolution Mechanism cum Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) is centrally managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB). Hence, 
the scope of OLA, which encompasses securities brokers and dealers, and other non-bank 
financial companies, is broader than the EU framework. Moreover, OLA cannot apply to 
insured banks, which are exclusively resolved under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(FDIA) by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
Table 1. Main differences between EU and US SIFI resolution frameworks 
 European Union  United States 
Legal framework Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), supplemented by 
Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) for euro area countries 
Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(OLA) provision of the Dodd-Frank. 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 
Scope All credit institutions, (mixed) 
financial holdings, and investment 
firms 
Systemically important non-credit 
financial institutions  
Objectives Limiting the direct costs for the tax 
payers although minimising moral 
hazard is not an explicit objective  
 
OLA explicitly bars any losses to tax 
payers   
Governance Cumbersome and incentive 
structure not fully aligned 
Quick decision-making 
Bail-in approach Possible both before and after 
receivership 
Only After Receivership   
– no pre-failure bail-in limiting the 
loss given default 
Source: Authors. 
The OLA and EU framework have also similarities and differences regarding objectives, 
tools and approaches, which will be discussed hereafter. 
Objectives  
The general objectives of both frameworks are to ensure the continuity of critical functions; 
to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including to prevent contagion and 
to protect insured depositors and client relations, while minimizing the public and private 
costs of resolution.  
An important distinction between the EU and US frameworks is that minimizing moral 
hazard is not an explicit objective in the EU. In the EU, the resolution objectives include 
minimizing reliance on extraordinary public funds subject to State Aid rules.1 In contrast, 
OLA specifically bars any losses to taxpayers and requires that all losses be borne by the 
failed company’s creditors or, if necessary, through contributions by other SIFIs. While 
debate over whether OLA provides a ‘bail-out’ to some creditors continues, there is no 
question about that taxpayers cannot bear the losses. The same is true in bank resolutions 
under the FDIA. 
                                                   
1 Article 31 of BRRD and Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 
2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis 
(“Banking Communication”) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730(01)&from=EN). 
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Governance 
The resolution of a SIFI requires quick and decisive action because uncertainty will lead to a 
rapid unwinding of its operations and dissipation of its value. While a decision can be made 
quickly, experience shows that speed requires a streamlined decision-making process. OLA 
requires recommendations from super-majorities of the Board of Governors and the FDIC2 
and a decision by the Treasury Secretary in consultation with the President, experience in 
2008 shows that such decisions can be made over a weekend in a crisis. 
In the SRM, the decision-making process also involves the political power. However, the 
decision-making process on whether to finance a cross-border bank resolution via the SRF 
and, if not sufficient, the mutualised national bank resolution funds (NRFs) is cumbersome 
and common fiscal backstops have not been developed as yet.  Such complexity derives from 
the desire of the creditor countries to protect their right of objection to contribute to the 
funding of cross-border bank resolution.3  
Once the decision to resolve a SIFI is made, the question then turns to how to fund a 
resolution and whether the tools available to the resolution authority provide powers to stem 
the potential systemic risks. 
Funding 
On both sides of the Atlantic, funding for bank resolutions comes primarily from banks. In 
the US, the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund is funded principally through assessments from 
member banks and protects insured depositors and provides financing for bank resolutions. 
Similarly, in the EU the NRFs4 and Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs)5 are funded from 
member banks. DGSs serve to compensate insured depositors and NRFs finance bank 
resolution tools and compensate bailed-in creditors left worse off than in liquidation.6  
Funding for SIFIs resolutions is somewhat different – as reflects the potential systemic 
consequences. Both the EU and the US resolution frameworks recognise that public funding 
                                                   
2 The SEC in case of brokers and dealers or the Director of the Federal Insurance Office in the case of 
insurance companies. 
3 Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. 
ECOFIN, 14 May 2014 (Intergovernmental Agreement –IA-). Recourse to all contracting parties 
(contributors to cross border bank resolution funding) is very protected by the IA that requires, first, 
financial recourse to the national compartments of the SRF. If such funding is not sufficient, the IA 
envisages recourse to all contracting parties (mutualised part of the SRF - full mutualisation will take 
place only after 8 years starting 2016), if not sufficient to finance resolution tools, recourse will be 
made to the remaining financial means of national compartments. If not sufficient, the IA envisages 
extraordinary "ex post" contributions from banks of the member states where the cross border bank is 
incorporated. If not immediately accessible, the Single Resolution Authority (Board) will decide on 
temporary transfers between compartments not yet mutualised of the SRF up to maximum of 50% 
(Board will decide on terms and conditions). Board decision should exclude financing of objecting 
contracting parties based on a number of reasons contemplated in the IA (i.e. the objecting member 
state considers that will need those financial resources in the near future or the objecting member state 
considers that the borrower does not have the financial capacity to pay back are among the reasons 
envisaged in the IA). 
4 Single Resolution Fund funded by deposit institutions in the participating members in the SRM. 
5 BRRD, Article 109: Use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution. 
6 BRRD, Article 101 Use of the resolution financing arrangements.  
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may be necessary.7 The EU Framework provides for public funds (“only to the extent 
necessary”) to facilitate resolution transactions, including guarantees for a bridge 
institution.8 Temporary access to public funds corresponds to EU countries´ fiscal 
sovereignty requiring burden-sharing coordination and authorisation by the Commission in 
the context of its State Aid policy. In the US, the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF) from the 
Treasury may be used for similar functions. Funds from the OLF are repaid first from the 
proceeds of the resolution, and if this priority is insufficient, the industry can be assessed to 
recoup the balance. By law, no taxpayer losses from the liquidation process are allowed. 
Such legal prohibition does not exist in the EU Framework although the wording of the 
BRRD reflects the purpose of reducing public exposure to the extent possible and making it 
conditional to a minimum burden-sharing with private investors.9 
Tools 
Both approaches provide similar tools to facilitate continuity and avoid a destabilising 
collapse of operations.  
Under OLA as well as the EU frameworks, resolution authorities have the powers to 
suspend certain obligations, transfer assets and liabilities to new purchasers or to bridge 
financial institutions, and temporarily suspend the rights of counterparties to enforce their 
rights to collateral and terminate contracts with the failed company. Both the EU framework 
and OLA include special provisions that stay the exercise of cross-default clauses if any 
guaranty is transferred to a solvent third party or adequate assurances are otherwise 
provided. Under both frameworks, the resolution authorities are given tools to continue key 
operations, services and transactions that will maximise the value of the firm’s assets and 
operations and avoid a disorderly collapse in the marketplace. The authority to transfer 
operations to a bridge company is designed to preserve systemic activities that, if 
interrupted, could create a spiral of contagion.  
A key distinction  
Perhaps one of the most significant difference between OLA and EU frameworks is that the 
latter allows action to prevent the failure of a credit institution. OLA requires that all SIFIs 
subject to resolution must be closed and resolved.10 This difference is significant because it 
                                                   
7 In the US, FDIC may borrow from the Treasury among other things, to make loans to, or guarantee 
obligations of, a covered financial company or a bridge financial company to provide liquidity for the 
operations of the receivership and the bridge financial company. In the EU, public funding of bank 
resolution is envisaged in order to preserve financial stability. When the use of the resolution tools 
involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be assessed in accordance with the 
State aid provisions. 
8 BRRD, Article 101. 
9 BRRD, Articles 43 and 44. Only when bailing in of private investors and funding from resolution 
funds are not sufficient, could be recourse to either the member state’s own taxpayer resources 
(provided such recourse received state aid approval from the Commission) or, in the case of banks 
headquartered in the Euro area to the European Stability Mechanism’s direct bank recapitalization 
facility. Any such taxpayer support would be subject to the Commission’s State Aid rules and to the 
systemic exception. 
10 While OLA technically requires the SIFI to be ‘liquidated’ this term is defined by the statutory 
powers in OLA, which give the FDIC authority to resolve the SIFI to preserve value and limit systemic 
risks. Arguments that ‘liquidation’ in OLA requires a value-destroying fire-sale are not supported by 
the statutory framework.  
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reveals a divergence in approach and probable outcomes of US and EU frameworks. This 
divergence is best illustrated in the bail-in tool. 
An important distinction – which is often confused – is between closed bank bail-in and open 
bank bail-in. Closed bank bail-in simply describes the FDIC’s long-standing process for 
failed banks in which all creditors are ‘bailed-in’ by having their claims impaired in 
proportion to the bank’s losses and the creditors’ seniority under the statutory claims 
hierarchy. Insured depositors are protected under FDIA, but uninsured depositors may lose 
money. OLA, like the FDIA, does not include an explicit bail-in tool because all liabilities are 
subject to impairment and bail-in to cover losses after closure. The OLA exit strategy of 
capitalising a new holding company by bailing-in pre-existing creditors is designed to have a 
completely new company, with a restructured balance sheet, emerge from insolvency.  
In turn the EU Framework explicitly authorises open bank bail-in.11 The EU approach, in 
contrast with OLA, is a recapitalisation of the existing credit institution and would not 
involve a formal insolvency (receivership) proceeding. It requires the restructuring and 
recapitalisation of the existing open institution and bails-in certain creditors to achieve a 
new, strengthened balance sheet. 
Combined with the ability under the EU Framework to utilise funding from the resolution 
funds, despite the conditional minimum creditor bail-in and maximum NRF/SRF 
contribution, this could allow a credit institution in Europe to remain open and operating 
with potentially greater protection for creditors than the closed institution approach in the 
US. 
There has been much debate about which approach to bail-in is likely to achieve greater 
continuity and systemic stability and encourage more market discipline. Given the greater 
flexibility under the EU resolution framework to take action to preserve a credit institution 
without putting it through an insolvency process, it remains an open question to what 
degree the new EU resolution framework will significantly limit moral hazard. Irrespective 
of the merits of the competing approaches, it is important to recognise that bail-in and 
resolution continue to reflect significant differences between the US and the EU. These 
differences mirror different institutional frameworks and histories, different expectations 
around resolution, and likely different future strategies in spite of the similar objectives. 
These differences should be discussed openly by all stakeholders to ensure that the trajectory 
of a future crisis does not itself create inconsistencies and an uneven playing field.   
  
                                                   
11 See BRRD Articles 43-58. For a discussion of the advantages of the open SIFI approach, see Bank of 
England (2014).  
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